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1forthcoming: Business Strategy and the EnviromnentAbstract
A trend towards "softer" regulation, especially in the form of negotiated
environmental agreements, is observable in national and international
environmental policies. Such agreements are controversial, because there are fears
that government will relinquish its responsibility for environmental protection. This
paper analyses recent experiences with voluntary agreements in Germany. Topical
German examples that have prompted public debates include the takeback
agreement for cars, the voluntary agreement made by a number of industries on a
C02 reduction by the year 2005 and the voluntary agreement made by the
automobile industry on the development ofenergy-efficient cars.
Proponents of voluntary agreements argue that this instrument provides incentives
to the business sector for the development of efficient, innovative and
environmentally-friendly solutions. Analysing the examples mentioned above, we
conclude that it is hard to detect solutions derserving such attributes. These
agreements are unlikely to produce results that go beyond what industry would have
done in any case and they avoid using economic incentives. The agreements are'
non-binding and unenforceable, with the negotiating process leading to a watering
down ofthe environmental goals government had originally aimed at. A preference
for negotiated solutions on principle, as currently espoused by the Federal
Government in Germany, seems to be "counterproductive". If the government
clearly signals its willingness to refrain from using regulatory or economic
instruments in favour of industry agreements, it weakens its negotiating position.
The government also limits its options should the implementation of the agreement
prove unsatisfactory. Government needs to be ,In control" in order to leave its
choice ofpolicy instruments open and to be flexible. In a last step, we derive some
general conlusions concerning reasonable strategies and applications of voluntary
agreements within the European Union.
Key words: negotiated agreements, climate protection, circular economy, economic
instruments ofenvironmental policy
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By reverting to common command and control measures preventive environmental
protection can entail a considerable extension of government intervention. The
German Federal Government believes that this should be increasingly counteracted
through cooperation between government and the business community, amongst
other things through voluntary environmental protection measures. However, these
"soft" instruments involve the risk ofgovernment relinquishing its responsibility for
the environment. Negotiated agreements made by the business community, like the
pledges to develop so-called 3-litre cars, to take back old cars or to reduce carbon
dioxide emissions, are therefore controversial from an ecological and economic
point ofview.
The economic perspective is specified here from a neo-liberal perspective. In a
liberal approach, markets should coordinate the allocation of goods as far as no
market failure can be observed. But when external effects, information deficiencies
or inflexibilities exist, the state is responsible for correcting these kinds of market
failure. However, the state has to choose the option which minimises market
distortions. In other words: Market-based instruments like taxes or tradeable
emission permits are generally preferable. Nevertheless, other types of instruments
like voluntary agreements can be used alternatively or additionally when they have
advantages with regard to certain criteria (e.g. efficiency, institutional
controllability, minimisation ofunwanted side-effects).
Especially the German Ordo-Liberal-School in the tradition of Eucken argues in
favour of a government correcting market failure, and against an interventionist
state. Principles and criteria ofthe ordo-liberal school will be specified in chapter 3
where we jn general develop an analytical framework for the valuation of
environmental policy measures with special interest in the application to voluntary
agreements. Since ordoliberalism is mainly a German economic school, it should be
mentioned that similar ideas have been established in other countries. For example,
the so-called Oxford-Liberals have created the guideline "as much competition as
possible, as much planning as necessary" (GROSSEKETTLER 1991:106).2
2 However, the'ordoliberal school focuses more on the responsibility ofthe state to establish basic
rules for a regulatory framework within long-term oriented economic policy, while the Oxford-
Liberals give higher weight to policy measures in the short run.2 Attributes ofvoluntary agreements in Germany
2.1 Negotiated agreements: soft, non-voluntary and outofkeeping
with a marketeconomy
Negotiated agreements made by the business community are generally called
voluntary. However, what government does is more like showing the instruments of
torture to the victim as a first step of torture. Comparable to what, in former times,
torturers would do with their instruments, nowadays the Minister for the
Environment presents a draft for an ordinance so as to achieve "voluntary"
concessions (MURSWIEK 1988:985). Hence, in principle such cooperative
solutions can be interpreted as barter transactions in which the business community
imposes an obligation on itself to act in a certain manner, and government in return
refrains from enforcing the desired conduct.
In the debate on environmental policy, voluntary agreements are sometimes
pictured as "a free-market instrument". This description is only justified in the case
of instruments that use the price mechanism. There are, however, only a few
exceptional voluntary agreements which fall back on this fundamental free-market
principle. These include the "Grline Punkt" ("Green Dot"), which in economic
terms can be characterized as a levy helping to charge the costs relating to the
disposal of packaging in accordance with the polluter pays principle. Yet,as·a rule
negotiated agreements shy away from such "tough" economic instruments and do
not touch the structure of relative prices; after all, negotiated agreements do not
spring from the market system, but rather from political negotiations between
government and trade associations. However, an approach that is essentially based
on negotiated solutions should not be characterized as market-based, but as a
corporatist approach (HOLZHEYffEGNER 1996:426-427). The main difference is
that consumers have corhmonly no possibility to participate in the negotiation
process, although the consumer surplus is highly influenced by the result of the
negotiations (improvement ofenvironmental quality).
2.2 Sovereign versus corporatist approach in environmental policy
Voluntary agree~ents can contain all kinds of instruments. Goals or technical
instructions for a specific industry, but also scales of charges and information
systems are conceivable. That is why the agreements do not have any working
mechanism in their own right, rather the latter depends on the instruments provided





Voluntary environmental protection measures differ markedly from the classic
model ofa rule-issuing government trying to achieve its environmental policy goals
through commands and prohibitions. Government refrains from using any
instruments offormal power, i.e. from enacting legal norms, and instead enters into
negotiations on the realization ofthe environmental goals with the groups affected.
In doing so, government uses the "threat" of enacting restrictive legal norms as a
starting point for negotiating a voluntary agreement and thus exerts a guiding
influence on the business community's conduct (HOFFMANN-RIEM 1990:400,
426; BROHM 1992:1025, 1027). In contrast to traditional sovereign action,s,
government seeks a solution via consensus-building. However, this bargaining_
process holds dangers. Unlike any cooperation in the form ofthe right to be heard,'
the right of participation or of involvement, agreements are based on a system of
service-and-service-in-return. For the government side the price for an agreement
often consists in reducing the announced level ofenvironmental protection. In order
to attain a consensus, government accepts "a downward correction of goals". This
,,lowering ofthe regulatory level" can tum out to be more or less marked. However,
as the case studies examined in connection with this study bear out, a "decrease in
the stringency of regulations" is always observable (BAUER 1987:241, 254). With
regard to the demands made in terms of environmental policy, the upshot is that
there is a tendency for agreements to fall short ofthe opportunities arising from the
implementation in the form of laws and ordinances (MUGGENBORG 1990:909,
915). The reasons for this danger of relativizing the level of environmental
protection in connection with cooperative solutions are complex. The mode of
action "agreement" by itself suggests a shift away from maximum demands, since a
joint solution can only be found in the intersection of possible regulations that is
deemed acceptable to both sides. Government should realize that the readiness to
negotiate expressed by the business community inevitably only goes as far as the
latter's economic self-interest. Protecting the environment is not a value in its own
right to the companies concerned. Instead it has to coincide with their own
(economic) interests. Finally, what may also be relevant is the fact that it is not
individual businesses that" negotiate with government, instead as a rule they are
represented by their associations, which, experience shows, tend to take a more
rigid stand.
It is also significant that voluntary agreements do not only affect the interests ofthe
two negotiating parties, but also to a variable extent the positions of third-parties.
Agreements are always associated with the danger of consensus-building at the
expense of non-involved parties, which have little opportunity to integrate their
interests into the agreements being negotiated. Furthermore, consideration has to be
given to the powers of participation that would have to be taken into account in
3connection with a legislative procedure or the issuing of an ordinance, but that
never features in informal negotiations on voluntary agreements. The mere right to
be heard should not be completely excluded from the negotiation procedure.
2.2.2 Enforcing the agreement
Concerning the enforcement ofan agreement, what has to be stressed is that a mere
promise still fails to guarantee its actual implementation. Companies not complying
with the pledges (given by their association) do not risk any fines, penalties orother
coercive measures (cf. HOFFMANN-RIEM 1990:400, 438; MURSWIEK
1988:985, 988). There is no claim to performance in the case of a voluntary
agreement; indeed, what characterizes agreements is the lack of any binding force
and of enforceability. In contrast to a contractual relationship, the party pledging
voluntary measures never enters into any legal obligations. Contracts and
agreements are similar in that both have an exchange of services in common. The
relationship "do ut des", in other words a mutual give-and-take, is typical of
contractual relations and agreements alike. However, the binding force ofa contract
- "pacta sunt servanda" - is completely foreign to negotiated agreements.
Agreements are more likely to be categorized as a gentlemen's agreement, which
does not entail any legal consequences. Even ifin connection with an agreement the
government side was granted the right to monitor compliance ofthe agreement, this
does not constitute a claim to performance. In fact, the point is that the businesses
underpinning the agreement do not want to be bound the way they are in contracts.
The companies (or rather their associations) make a voluntary agreement without
the so-called intention of legal consequences. The agreement solely consists of a
declaration ofthe companies' willingness to act in a certain way, tolerate something
or refrain from doing something; the government side is not granted any claim to
performance. Consequently, any legal action founded on the agreement brought
against the declarant would be doomed to failure. Whether or not compliance with
the agreement is monitored makes no difference from a legal point of view, since
violation of the agreement does not entail any legal consequences (cf. BEYER
1986:277ff.; 282; HENNEKE 1991:267, 271ff.; BROHM 1994:1025,1034).
3 Analytical raster for assessing voluntary agreements
The Freiburg ordoliberal school holds that the absence of markets, and any
functional defects of existing markets, will result in corrective requirements which
cannot be covered solely by an evolutionary competition of institutions - a view
which will be pursued here below. This school regards as inadequate the process of
natural selection emerging from international competition between institutions
evolving as a quasi-random process, but not specified by the state, and the resultant
elimination of inefficient institutional bodies. On the contrary, the Freiburg neo-
liberals' concept of a free-enterprise economy presupposes that the state must
selectively create institutions -for countering existing defects and challenges
4(GROSSEKETTLER 1991:104-106). The efficiency of such institutions must be
measured in terms ofhow far the principles offree enterprise are respected.
Seen from the perspective ofordoliberalism voluntary agreements are regarded with
scepticism. Government no longer - as postulated in the ordoliberal model - stakes
out the regulatory framework within which entrepreneurs can dedicate themselves
to profit-making. Instead government delegates this responsibility to the businesses
themselves. However, in the opinion of ordoliberals a laissez-faire policy with a
market economy left to its own devices tends to destroy itself. Failure to protect and
promote competition may lead to closed-off markets, cartels, price fixing and
ultimately to a distorted price structure. A lack ofcompetition and the wrong price
signals in tum may entail a spate of government interventions, e.g. measures to
monitor prices and regulatory requirements concerning the application of given
environmental technologies (due to a lack of price incentives). That is why those
economists who consider government to be a powerful custodian of the system in
the tradition of Eucken's ordoliberal school view the trend in environmental policy
towards voluntary agreements with great concern (MAIER-RIGAUD 1995).
However, the following assessment will test these hypotheses by applying the
ordoliberal principles to concrete case studies of voluntary agreements. The
generalized analytical raster in table 1 comprises a catalogue of check criteria
applying to the selection of instruments for eliminating deficits in a free-enterprise
economy (cf. RENNINGS et al., 1996 for a detailed explanation of the criteria
involved).
Table 1: Systematized check criteria for evaluating economic policy measures in tenns of
regulatory efficacy
Step 1: Goal formulation and Qperationalization:
- Fonnulating the targeted goal system
- Indicators
- Assignment ofgoals, means and implementing agencies
Step 2: LeaitimizatiQn ofthe action's goal in termsofcontracttheory:
- Hypothetical justification (Rawls)
- Reference to conclud~ntaction
Step3: Selection ofthe decisiQn-making leveVprocess:
- Subsidiarity principle
- Congruence principle:
- Equivalence: the user group must coincide with the payer group for a collective
good
- Democratic monitoring: the group ofthe decision-impacted must coincide with the
group ofentitled monitorers
Step 4: Eronomic ledtimizatjQn QfactiQns formulated;
- Choice ofinstruments: selection ofconceivable instruments for goal implementation
- Effectiveness (goal-conformity):
5Degree ofgoal attainment (direction and dosage)
Speed ofgoal attainment
Invariance against changes in the macro-economic boundary conditions
Necessity (system-conformity):
Market-conformity:
Instrumental subsidiarity: designing measures with minimized impact on
individuals' powers ofdecision-making (centralized/decentralized)
creation offully functional markets (free price formation, fully functional
competition)
Minimizing intervention into the functioning ofexisting markets
Priority ofregulatory before process policy: formulation ofa long-term
orientation framework, and avoidance ofstop-and-go measures
Minimization ofdetectable unwanted side-effects:
- Stability-policy goals (economic compatibility)
- Distribution-policy goals (social compatibility)
Economic efficiency:
Static economic efficiency (cost-efficiency):
- Purpose/avoidance costs
- Transaction costs
Dynamic economic efficiency (innovation efficiency)
Institutional controllability: implementability in the political process and allowance for
the possibilities for abuse in the political/administrative apparatus
Source: Inbroad conformity with GROSSEK.E1TLER (1991: p. 114).
6With regard to voluntary agreements, these criteria can be interpreted and applied
by the following questions:
Step 1 and 2: Goal operationalisation and justification
• What environmental goal does the measure examined in a given case study refer to?
• How can the targets be measured?
• Can this goal be justified hypothetically (Rawls theory of justice) or empirically (democratic
decisions, concludent action)?
• Was the goal originally pursued watered down as early as during the negotiation process or
were there any delays?
Step 3: Selection ofthe decision-making level/process
• Are decisions taken at an appropriate level with regard to the principles of subsidiarity and
congruence?
• Is any environmental responsibility delegated and, ifso, how is the delegation to be assessed?
Step 4: Economic legitimization ofactions formulated
• Choice ofinstruments: what are the relevant instruments agreements have to be compared with?
• Goal conformity: Is it possible to achieve the specific underlying environmental policy goal
with the help ofthe given agreement?
• System conformity: Is the measure in keeping with the system of a social market economy? Is
the system strengthened, does it remain unchanged or is it weakened? Are detectable unwanted
side-effects minimized?
• Economic efficiency: Are the costs higher or lower than when using other instruments? What
incentives are provided to achieve technological progress?
• Institutional controllability: How immune are voluntary agreements to political influences that
can dilute their desired effect? How do the associations deal with the problem offree riders?
74 Choice ofCase Studies
The assessment scheme to evaluate environmental policy measures is applied to
topical examples taken from the fields of climate protection and circular economy.
The problem area of the promotion of clean technology is cross-sectional in nature
because it is relevant for both fields ofenvironmental policy.
4.1 Climate protection
The Chlorofluorcarbon (CFC)-phase-out and the reduction in carbon dioxide
emissions will serve as case studies from the area of climate protection. The CFC-
case study derives its relevance from the fact that the progress made in phasing out
CFCs is often cited as a case for the economic and ecological advantageousness of
using voluntary agreements. Voluntary agreements, the argument goes, result in the
ecological goal being attained more quickly, trigger off an innovation drive in
industry and safeguard industry's export capability. The carbon dioxide case study
is the obvious choice, not only because of its particularly prominent role in the
global warming problem. Accounting for 60% ofthe damage, anthropogenic carbon
dioxide emissions are the largest cause of the greenhouse effect. Moreover, with
regard to the carbon dioxide problem the German business community presented an
updated voluntary agreement in March 1996. This German negotiated agreement
has come to be considered a model for the European Union's climate policy.
4.2 Circular economy
Particularly in the field of German waste disposal policy, voluntary agreements
dominate other measures. The significance of negotiated agreements in the area of
waste disposal policy is explicitly stressed by the Federal Government. In order to
place greater emphasis on waste avoidance, Germany created the
Kreislaufwirtschafts- und Abfallgesetz (Act on a Circular Economy and Waste),
which has come into force since October 1996. Producers of, say, electronic goods
and batteries can pre-empt industry-specific ordinances through negotiated
agreements and can voluntarily comply with the legal obligations. The voluntary
agreement on the disposal of old cars made by the automobile industry, which is
being used as a case study, also has to be seen against this background. In addition,
an analysis of the Duales System Deutschland' (DSD, Dual System Germany) will
be carried out.
4.3 Clean technology
A further case study to be examined is the so-called 3-litre car, which serves as an
example of clean technologies. Although there is overlap between that case study
and others - for clean technology is used in climate protection as well as in
strategies ofmaterial flow management aiming at establishing a circular economy -
8this area is to be dealt with separately. It seems likely that in the future clean
technologies will be ofgreat importance on the road to a sustainable economy, and
the question arises how such a development can be encouraged without repeating
the mistakes made in the past (regulatory enactment ofbest available technologies)
and what part voluntary environmental protection measures can play in this.
5 Goal operationalisation and legitimation
5.1 Climate protection
To start off with, one has to exarillne whet~er in individual environmental policy
areas operational goals have been defined which could serve as a yardstick for the
evaluation of voluntary agreements. As for the case study taken from climate
protection, there are specific national and international reduction goals for
greenpouse gases and ozone-depleting substances to which one can revert without
any reservations. The goals are operational and can be justified by theoretical
reasonirig and conclurlent actions.
5.2 CirciIlar economy
it is much harder to answer the question how goals relating to the establishment ofa
circuiar economy can be described in concrete tenns and in a manner being
compatible with a liberal market system. On the whole die disposal crisis in the
Gennan waste disposal industry has eased, thus no bottlenecks concerning dump or
incineration capacities are foreseen for the future. Regional crises can primarily be
put down to compulsory (regional) disposal self-sufficiency. Nationally solid waste
production has stabilized or is even falling. Recycling capacities are being built,
numerous plants are in the planning stage and there are reserve capacities (cf.
BRENCK et al. 1996:2-4).
Although the situation has been defused, a goal has to be fonnulated for a future-
oriented waste disposal policy which is oriented towards controlling solid waste
production and towards an adjustment ofthe latter to existing dump capacities. For
the case studies chosen from the sphere of waste disposal policy, goals appropriate
to the problem have to be specified. The case studies were chosen to illustrate two
different aspects ofthe waste disposal problem. Whereas packaging waste primarily
constitutes a quantitative problem, the problem relating to the disposal ofold cars is
primarily qualitative in nature.
The disposal of old cars creates a need for environmental policy measures,
especially because ofthe large volume ofshredder waste that has accumulated after
the disposal of some 2.6 million old cars each year. This waste is a mixture of
plastics, glass, textiles and wood fibre substances, which cannot be recycled and can
only be put on a dump. Its volume amounts to about 1.5% of the domestic waste
9volume in Germany and is therefore fairly small, but owing to its explosive make-
up, this waste is classified as hazardous waste.
Packaging waste, on the other hand, primarily poses a quantitative problem that in
terms of quality is not explosive in nature. With regard to weight, packaging waste
accounts for roughly 30 per cent of domestic waste, twenty times the annual
shredder volume from the disposal ofold cars.
The voluntary agreement on environmentally-sound recycling of old cars made by
the automotive industry aims at improving the recycling ofold cars as well as ofold
car components, and especially at reducing the amount ~f shredder waste,
processing old cars in keeping with the needs ofthe environment and at going easy
on dump capacities and raw materials.
The catalogue of measures included in the voluntary agreement distinguishes
between the processing of old cars that were registered before the voluntary
agreement came into force ("existing car fleet") and the processing of old cars
registered after the coming into force of the voluntary agreement ("future car
fleet"). This distinction makes sense, since the producers' scope for reducing
resource consumption as well as solid waste production differs. With respect to the
future car fleet, additional options present themselves due to changes in design,
construction, materials chosen etc.
The most important measures mentioned in the voluntary agreement to attain the
goals that were set are:
• Establishment of a nation-wide take-back system of certified businesses for the
taking back and recycling of old cars within two years after the regulation takes
effect.
• Old cars from the existing fleet of cars are taken back at generally accepted
market terms.
• Old cars from the future carfleet that meet certain criteria (for instance, the initial
registration must not date back more than twelve years) are taken back free of
charge.
5.3 Clean technology
Finally, regarding the last case study the question has to be answered whether
supporting clean technology should be a goal ofenvironmental policy and how such
a goal can be formulated in operational terms. Although supporting clean
technology is a sensible environmental policy goal provided that the increased
application of this technology promises improvements in solving environmental
10problems, from an economic point of view environmental goals should not be
fonnulated in the fonn of technological standards, because this restricts the
available freedom for adjustment unnecessarily. Instead there should be an
orientation towards long-tenn environmental quality goals that leaves the decision
on the technology applied open for the time being. Such an orientation towards
long-tenn environmental goals which ideally should be fonnulated in such a way
that they cover various pollutants also constitutes an important stimulus for the
application ofclean technology.
Against this background an environmental policy goal like the "development ofa 3-
litre car", to which representatives of the Gennan automotive industry pledged
themselves at a meeting with the premiers of their respective Gennan states, has to
be viewed critically, as it largely determines the choice of technology. Similar in
nature is the voluntary pledge given by the Verband der Automobilindustrie (VDA,
Association ofthe Automotive Industry) ofMarch 1995 of a 25 per cent reduction,
based on the 1990 figure, by the year 2005 in the average fuel consumption of the
cars/estate cars it produces and sells in Gennany (ZIMMERMEYER 1995:2; VDA
1995). Itis planned to upgrade the pledge by the year 2000 to over 30 per cent.
These pledges are part of the efforts made in the past few years to reduce the fleet
consumption ofmotor vehicles (BMV 1995; SRU 1994).3
It has to be stressed that goals aiming at supporting clean technology - for example,
fuel-efficient vehicles - are only justifiable if they fonn part of a broader overall
plan~ The latter should be oriented towards the attainment of certain environmental
quality standards (e.g. climate stability). If such an overall plan exists, promoting
the development offuel-efficient motor vehicles, for example, can certainly be one
ofseveral "action-oriented goals" to pursue a higher environmental quality goal.
4
3 The European Commission is also backing the goal ofreducing fuel consumption. An essential
instrument of this strategy is the reduction in the average consumption to 5 litres per 100
kilometres for new vehicles with a petrol engine and 4.5 litres per 100 kilometres for new diesel
vehicles. In this context the Commission regards the deadline for implementation that the
European Parliament has in mind, the year 2005, as very ambitious (OKOLOGISCHE BRIEFE
1996 (5)). On account of the different carbon dioxide content in fuels like petrol, diesel and
natural gas, a standard limit of 120 milligramme ofcarbon dioxide per kilometre is to be fixed
(SZ of6 March 1996).
4 According to a definition given by the ENQUETE-KOMMISSION "SCHUTZ DES
MENSCHEN UND DER UMWELT" ("Protection of Humans and of the Environment"
Commission of Inquiry) (1995:4), environmental action-oriented goals "indicate the steps
necessary to achieve the characteristics of the environment or the states described in
environmental quality goals."
116 Choosing the decision-making level and process
6.1 International free riders push negotiated agreements in climate
policy
According to the principle ofcongruence included in the theory ofpublic goods, the
club deciding on the provision and funding of a good should ideally be identical to
the club benefiting from the good. A stable global climate benefits the entire world
population, consequently, a global institution would have to be founded to decide
on the provision and funding of the good "climate protection" in an ecpnomically
optimal manner. However, as long as there is neither an "Environment Security
Council" nor a comparable institution, the road via international agreements that has
been used so far, has to be followed further. In that connection one has to keep in
mind that any solution below the global level entails serious additional problems of
free rider-behaviour.
5 Amongst other things, the implications of this free rider-
behaviour have so far been seen in the fact that none of the leading industrialized
nations is willing to play a pioneering role in intrqducing climate taxes (MULLER
1995). This national wait-and-see attitude in the follow-up process to Rio has led to
an environmental policy standstill in the field ofglobal climate protection. Precisely
in view of this standstill in international climate policies, voluntary agreements
seem to be an instrument politicians and business representatives are taking up
readily, because it allows a certain degree of national activities without businesses
having to accept serious cost disadvantages in international competition. Voluntary
agreements in the field of climate protection have become common all over the
world.
6.2 Negotiated agreements in climate policy arise from a "no regrets"
approach
Originally, the policy of voluntary climate protection measures was pushed by the
US administration in particular, which had committed itselfat a very early stage to a
,,no regrets" strategy concerning climate protection
(KRAUSFJKOOMEY/OLIVIER 1994; RENNINGS 1994:83-86). Unsure about
possible climatic damage, the administration concluded that to be on the safe side, it
would only order measures to reduce greenhouse gases that even from a managerial
point of view were at least cost covering. To date the ,,no regrets" strategy has
contrasted with the ,,insurance buying" policy ofsome Western European states like
Germany. According to the latter policy, the climate protection standards that are
fixed are arrived at on the basis of a global warming deemed just about acceptable
5 which, admittedly, a global club does not necessarily abolish either, if, say, decisions relating to
the funding of climate protection programmes and to the allocation of these funds to the
beneficiaries are taken independently ofone another.
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and on the basis of reduction goals derived from the latter. In order to reduce the
risk of climatic damage, the costs involved in achieving the standards are accepted
as a quasi-insurance premium. While most industrial countries have so far merely
formulated the stabilization of climate-relevant emissions as a climate protection
goal, the Federal Government is pursuing a relatively ambitious goal with an
absolute reduction of25 % by the year 2005 compared with the 1990 level.
Now the question is whether this national reduction goal can be attained with "no
regrets" measures - and one can hardly expect more on the basis of voluntary
agreements. An optimistic answer to this question is fed by estimates in the latest
report submitted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC
1995b:20), according to which "no regrets" measures have a reduction potential of
10 to 30 per cent in the next 20 to 30 years. The enormous potential of"no regrets"
measures, which microeconomic studies have also identified in the OECD-countries
including Germany, is attributed to the fact that profitable investments in improved
energy' efficiency have so far never materialized due to substantive market failure
and to shortcomings in the coordination between institutions. Examples of these
impediments are a lack of information and of economic incentives to conserve
energy in the case ofpublic utilities. The possibilities to overcome the impediments
that are mentioned include deregulation measures, provision of advice and training
and upgraded financial support programmes. In addition, cooperative solutions, for
instance in the form of voluntary environmental protection measures, are seen as a
way of overcoming institutional impediments. Seen against this background,
voluntary agreements on a reduction in carbon dioxide emissions definitely have a
potential.
In contrast, initial experience gained in the US with the Climate Change Action
Plan (CCAP) of 1993, which essentially contains voluntary measures on the part of
public utilities and companies, is not promising. It seems as ifcurrent measures are
not sufficient to attain the US stabilization goal by the year 2000. Only individual
states - such as New York, which is able to replace decommissioned oil- and coal-
fired power plants with gas-fired ones in a cost-effective way - are expected to
achieve the stabilization goal. Yet, wherever costly adjustments would be necessary
that go beyond "no regrets" measures, the voluntary agreements do not appear to be
working (SANGHI 1995):
Once the goal in climate policy is in danger ofbeing missed, the real Achilles heel
ofvoluntary agreements is revealed. For now it becomes evident whether the tough
stance in environmental policy that was threatened in this case will really be taken
up. The Federal Government knows full well that the success of negotiated
agreements greatly depends on how credible the threat looming in the background
is. That is why it explicitly emphasized (BMU 1995:3) it would" remain in control"
and not hesitate to "use regulatory and fiscal instruments once it emerges that the
13pledge given by the business community amounts to little more than 'business as
usual' or fails to be complied with."
6.3 Takeback ofcars: watering down and postponement ofgoals
The voluntary agreement on the disposal of old cars resulted from years of
negotiations between the German Ministry for the Environment and associations of
the automotive industry. The desired goal, reducing the production of solid waste
from the disposal of old cars, is meant to help to provide a public good, namely
scarce dump capacities. The beneficiaries ofthis public good are the business sector
and the consumers. The business sector along with the buyers-of new cars and the
last owners of old cars also has to meet the costs arising from the creation of the
network of take-back businesses as well as from the development ofnew types of
construction, new materials and new forms of recycling. Only the business sector,
i.e. the automotive industry, was involved in the negotiating process. Since there
was no parliamentary debate either, an essential group ofbeneficiaries and payers of
the public good, the car buyers, was excluded even from ways of exerting indirect
influence on the decision-making process. This group does not have any
supervisory powers either. Thus, the principle of congruence has only partly been
met.
The corporatist approach in environmental policy is being criticized, amongst other
things, because of the danger of environmental policy goals being watered down.
For example, the willingness to make more far-reaching concessions to the
recycling of old cars is greater on the part of individual car producers than on the
part ofthe industry's associations.
The negotiating process concerning the disposal ofold cars reveals that as early as
1992 there was a complete draft for an ordinance including all essential elements of
the voluntary agreement made in 1996. However, due to the cooperative principle,
on which the waste disposal law is based and to which the Federal Government
attaches great importance in waste disposal policy, a negotiating process that lasted
several years followed between the government and the business sector. Therefore,
there was no noticeable acceleration of the decision-making process, on the
contrary, a delay occurred.
One comes to realize that once the government commits itself to a corporatist style
ofenvironmental policy, the other negotiating partner is granted a potential to delay
and water down goals that should not be underestimated. The example shows that
one has to urge politicians to keep their options open. A binding commitment
giving priority to cooperative solutions can deprive the instrument of voluntary
agreements of the basis for effective environmental policy improvements. For
example, there is some noticeable watering down of goals in the negotiated
14agreement on the disposal ofold cars with regard to the quotas fixed and the period
scheduled during which cars are taken backfree ofcharge.
6.4 Clean technology: negotiated agreements as an accompanying
instrument
At what level should the decisions on the application and promotion of clean
technology be taken? According to the principle of subsidiarity, one has to check
whether the decision on the application of the technology can also be taken at the
lowest level, i.e. in the markets. In principle, there are no objections to this when it
is a case ofapplying clean technology. Having said this, a decisive prerequisite for a
coordination via the price mechanism is that:
• first, there is an ecological framework that does not in general discriminate
against the application ofenvironmental technology.6
• second, this ecological framework is designed in such a way that it does not
especially impede the application ofend-of-pipe technologies to the detriment of
clean technology. Disadvantages clean technologies suffer from compared with
end-of-pipe solutions that can be put down to existing regulations, e.g. to an
orientation towards individual environmental media and pollutants, should be
reduced (HOHMEYERIKOSCHEL 1995).
Under the aforementioned conditions, markets offer a suitable coordination
mechanism for decisions on technology application. On this basis voluntary
agreements can fulfill an accompanying function and be used wherever rules remain
incomplete and have to be supplemented.
7 Evaluating 'the instrument
7.1 Goal conformity
7.1.1 CFC-negotiated agreement: in certain applications in conformity with
the goals
So far voluntary agreements to reduce ozone-depleting substances have definitely
been successful in ecological terms. The goals were exceeded, although there were
6 Empirical studies on inducing environmental innovations (GREEN et al. 1994:1051;
HEMMELSKAMP et al. 1995:19) show that vast numbers of environmental innovations are
caused through the existence and anticipation of environmentally-relevant regulations. Apart
from that, costs and revenue aspects playa role, with product innovations primarily aiming at
increasing sales and process innovations, on the other hand, at cutting costs.
15some critics who argued the phase-out could have been achieved even faster
(KOHLHAASIPRAETORIUS 1994:89). As a rule the monitoring of the negotiated
agreements is done by someone who is neutral. Negotiated agreements governing
the reduction ofCFCs\enjoyed special advantages (compared with the case study on
the reduction of carbon dioxide), since substitutes had already been discovered
which when applied did not lead to costs soaring and since additional pressure was
exerted by the demand side (slump in sales ofsprays containing CFCs). Thus, in an
entrepreneur's cost-benefit calculations, opting for a reduction in CFCs involved
little risk. On the other hand, continuing to manufacture products containing CFCs
would have been much riskier from a managerial point of view. This is also borne
out by the fact that although CFCs were speedily replaced in products, CFC-
substitution in production processes was slow to materialize, because the switch
was costlier and there was less pressure by the demand side.
7.1.2 No impetus for absolute COremission reductions
The business community's voluntary agreements on a reduction in carbon dioxide
of 1991 and 1995 came in for a lot of criticism, because they did not contain any
noticeable initiatives that clearly went beyond "business as usual". Criticism was
levelled in particular at the fact that it was hard to check whether the goal was being
achieved. The following minimum requirements for information (listed by the
German Federal Environmental Protection Agency) that should be included in a
negotiated agreement on carbon dioxide reduction (OKOLOGISCHE BRIEFE 1996
(2» were not met:
• reference and target year as well as a reduction path in the form of a timetable
with detailed information on partial goals,
• exact fixing ofemission or energy conservation goals,
• absolute energy consumption listed according to fuel,
• development ofprimary consumption,
• development ofspecific consUlt:Iption per technical unit,
• reductions achieved,
• in-depth comment on and analysis of the figures provided (e.g. information on
whether reductions are attributable to additional climate protection activities, an
economic slowdown or to modernization investments that would have been made
anyhow) as well as
• detailed list ofthe "special efforts" promised.
16The updated version of the negotiated agreement of March 1996 meets these
minimum requirements. The plan on carbon dioxide monitoring presented by the
BDI (Federation of German Industries) provides for associations to record their
reductions in a total of eight tables (BDI 1996). Total fossil fuel input, net power
supplied externally, energy input as well as specific carbon dioxide emissions
calculated from this and specific energy input are to be stated for the base year, the
previous year and the year under review. The demanded comment on and analysis
of the figures and the list of special efforts are also included. The reports are
checked by a neutral expert.
What is particularly striking is that no fewer than 12 out of 19 associations pledge
to reduce absolute carbon dioxide emissions. According to the Federal Government
(BUNDESREGIERUNG 1996a:3), the pledges correspond to a 20 per cent
reduction in emissions in these sectors. However, when one takes a closer look it is
precisely the achievement of absolute reduction goals that turns out to be the
agreement's real Achilles heel, something the statement made by the Vereinigung
Deutscher ElektriziUitswerke (VDEW, Association of German Electric Power
Stations) (VDEW 1996) illustrates.
According to the VDEW, the absolute reduction potential in the electricity industry
until the year 2015 amounts to 25 per cent compared with the base year of 1987.
However, compared with the base year of 1990, which the Federal Government is
now taking as a basis, estimates merely put the potential at 12 per cent. The figures
are even more off target if the target year of the Federal Government is taken as a
basis: The potential for the period up until the year 2005 is, compared with the
reference year of 1990, down to 8 to 10 per cent. Compliance with these pledges is
even conditional on ambitious prerequisites such as:
• a consensus in society on the exploitation of nuclear energy on the basis of
existing law, .
• an increase in the service life and capacity ofexisting nuclear power stations,
• the Miilheim-Karlich n~clear power station going into operation,
• the undisturbed operation ofexisting nuclear power stations and
• unrestricted choice offuels for the power stations on the part ofthe companies.
On the whole with regard to goal conformity, one can stress that shortcomings of
the instrument of voluntary agreements have been identified and in part abolished.
Still, when a comparison with the Federal Government's climate protection goals is
17made, one has to question the goal confonnity ofthis instrument, in particular ifall
other measures are discontinued due to the agreement that was made. To date the
development of absolute carbon dioxide emissions is by no means following a path
that makes this goal seem feasible (KOHLHAASIPRAETORIUS 1995:278). Nor
does the updated declaration issued by the German business sector indicate a new
trend concerning this path. Additional need for action can be deduced, in particular
for the German states that made up the FRG prior to unification. Ifthe VDEW puts
the absolute carbon dioxide reduction potential of German electric power stations,
which are responsible for about a third ofall German carbon dioxide emissions, at a
mere 8 to 10'per cent compared with the target year of 2005 (VDEW 1996:5), the
question arises as to who is to contribute the above-average reductions needed to
offset the expected increases in carbon dioxide emissions in areas like transport.
7.1.3 Takeback ofcars: business as usual
The assessment of goal confonnity in the case of voluntary agreements on the
disposal ofold cars is oriented towards the question whether the instruments chosen
are suited to achieve the top goal, the reduction in solid waste production and, in
particular, in shredder waste. First of all, one has to examine what the substantive
contribution is in the automobile industry's agreement compared with the way in
which old cars have been disposed of so far. Ifsome substance can be established,
the next question is whether the measures planned constitute an effective
contribution towards the solution to the problem.
Seen against the background of the conditions in the eXIstmg car-disposing
industry, the measures have to be considered out of keeping with the goals, since
they do not represent any change vis-a.-vis the status quo. There already is a nation-
wide take-back network made up of independent businesses. Besides, even today
the last owner is able to have his or her old car disposed of at generally accepted
market terms. These terms can mean that the last owner still manages to get a
positive market price for the old car.
The pledge to take back old cars from the future car fleet free of charge, provided
they are no older than 12 years, does not constitute a substantive measure either.
Firstly, most ofthe cars needing to be disposed of, do not come under this category.
According to the ADAC (the main association of motorists in Germany), the mean
age of a car whose registration has been cancelled is 13.2 years. If one takes data
provided by the manufacturers as a basis, no fewer 'than 8 out of 23 producers say
that the average life ofthe vehicles exceeds 15 years. Secondly, the pledge oftaking
cars back free of charge is obsolete, because according to the Arbeitsgemeinschaft
Deutscher Autorecyclingbetriebe GmbH (ada, Association of German Car
Recycling Businesses Ltd.) all old cars fitting the definition still fetch a positive
market price (AUTORECYCLING, issue 1/96).
18So far the bottom line of the study is that essential components of the take-back-
agreement are "business as usual" measures. More specifically, they do not
constitute new measures, as they will not lead to a substantive change in the way
things have been regulated so far. It is alarming that the negotiated agreement
encourages manufacturers and importers to assume control of the car-disposing
industry. Here there is a danger of the paradox that due to the voluntary agreement
not only will polluters - i.e. the producers with whom product responsibility lies -
not be charged costs in line with the polluter pays principle, but the polluters are
even provided with a framework for the opening-up of a novel and lucrative
business segment.
On the whole the voluntary agreement on the recycling of old cars made by the
German automotive industry and decisive components supplying industries, the car
component distribution sector and the car disposal industry, can be characterized as
a "business as usual" measure. The degree to which the environmental policy goal
is metis small.
7.1.4 Clean technology: policy mix including economic instruments makes
sense
Efficient measures to promote clean technology should take into account a
company's investment cycles and adjustment deadlines. In principle, voluntary
agreements can support this process, but by themselves they are often unsatisfactory
with regard to desired targets.
Agreements presupposing a commitment to refrain from introducing accompanying
economic instruments in return, have to be considered inappropriate to the goal. A
case in point seems to be the meeting ofthree German premiers with representatives
from the automotive industry of March 1995 at which moderation was pledged
concerning additional government measures such as an increase in mineral oil tax.
However, it is precisely the pledge to refrain from adopting these accompanying
measures that undermines the prospects of also marketing an energy-efficient car
successfully.7
With respect to the standards ofvehicle fleets, even at a company level it is not sure
whether the goals will bd achieved, since compliance with the standards depends on
the demand for individual models, which is something the company concerned finds
hard to anticipate. Moreover, so far all fuel-conserving models have been vehicles
The European Commission, which wants to see negotiated agreements on a reduction in the
consumption of the motor vehicle fleet, also seems to have realized this. The Commission's
estimation is that such an agreement would entail the risk of the newly-developed vehicle
models failing in the market. That is why the Commission believes such a measure has to be
combined with fiscal incentives for the consumers.
19with diesel engines and even modem diesel engines fitted with soot filters emit
three times as many carcinogenic substances as petrol engines. Consequently, the
German Council of Environmental Advisers warns of a one-sided policy on the
reduction of greenhouse gases and demands a greater reduction in carcinogenic
substances instead.
7.2 System conformity
7.2.1 Non binding agreements: no sanctions against unfair players
Voluntary agreements can constitute solutions in keeping with the system, if they
establish binding standards for the parties involved and if free-rider behaviour can
be prevented. However, since associations normally do not possess any effective
mechanisms to punish their members, and hence no binding rules of the game can
be agreed, the approach to problem-solving shifts to the moves ofthe game, that is
to say to the- wrong level in the system. As KREUZBERG (1993:308) writes,
voluntary agreements hinge on "a disproportionately high participation of 'honest
companies' in environmental protection activities and therefore lead to a
redistribution ofburdens to the detriment of'honest' players."
7.2.2 CFC-phase out: "soft"instruments appropriate for preventive strategies
Prohibitions are definitely measures to avert concrete and acute damage to the
environment that are in keeping with the system. In such situations the liberal
principle ofmaximising freedom cannot be used as a yardstick for policy design on
constitutional grounds (BROCKMANN et al. 1995:70). That means that
instruments with low intervention intensity and a high degree of freedom, such as
negotiated agreements, can only take precedence as long as it is safeguarded that
acute environmental damage will be averted. If this is not the case, "tough"
instruments will be applied. This is also evident in the CFC-example: The realistic
alternative to a voluntary reduction in the production ofCFCs and ozone-depleting
substitutes would have been a quick ban on these substances. In order to bring about
a complete phase-out of CFC-application in products, finally the complementary
CFC-halon-prohibition ordinance was issued in Germany. The aerosol industry did
not agree to a voluntary phase-out desired by the Ministry for the Environment
(KOHLHAASIPRAETORIUS 1994:89).
8
8 The way to protect the ozone layer that is more in keeping with the system than anything else
would be to apply "tough" instruments presenting economic incentives, as was done in the US.
There politicians successfully opted for the application of a mix of instruments comprising
levies and permits (COOK 1996:4).
207.2.3 Climate policy: long-term danger ofintervention spiral
A characteristic of voluntary environmental protection measures in the field of
climate protection frequently cited as being particularly in keeping with the system,
is that these measures, compared with energy and carbon taxes, cause fewer side-
effects on goals relating to stability and distribution policies. The "double dividend"
of an ecological tax reform is often overrated, the argument goes, i.e. the
simultaneous achievement of ecological (reduction in greenhouse gases) and
economic goals (e.g. job creation) due to the revenue-neutral compensation of
ecological taxes (KOSCHELIWEINREICH: 1995).
However, if emitters are charged the adjustment costs caused by a climatically-
sound restructuring of capital assets, this has to be regarded as being in keeping
with the market, irrespective of the compensation question. A "policy of little
steps", which the German Council of Environmental Advisers advocates, would
primarily send the necessary price signals to consumers for a more economical use
of energy. This would be the crucial advantage over voluntary agreements.
Secondly, a policy of little steps would minimise the side-effects on goals in the
fields of stability and distribution policies. For voluntary agreements are primarily
not in keeping with the market and the system, because such price signals usually
are not included in the instruments they are provided with. A climate policy based
on voluntary agreements is thus always associated with the danger that even a high
"no regrets" potential that could be siphoned off is overcompensated by increasing
energy consumption - not only in the sphere oftransport.
In the long run failure to attain the goals leads to new government intervention in
the form oflimits, technical instruction and rules ofconduct. As long as there are no
permanent and effective incentives to buy and use energy-efficient technologies or
to practise energy-conserving behaviour, failure to attain goals has to be abolished
with the help of such new regulations. Regulations on driving behaviour, the
purchase ofenergy-efficient motor vehicles or on using state-of-the-art technologies
for heat insulation purposes are examples of such a catalogue of measures. Unless
in the long run plans for voluntary climate protection measures are accompanied by
price instruments which are in keeping with the market, there is a risk of setting a
spiral of intervention in motion that should have been stopped through this
instrument in the first pl~ce.
7.2.4 Circulareconomy: effects ofnegotiated agreementoncompetition
Cooperation between individual trade associations and government can lead to
informal marketing agreements, to markets being shielded and to barriers to market
entry for third parties being erected. That these fears cannot be dismissed is shown
by the case studies taken from the problem area circular economy. From the point of
view of competition policy, buzz words in environmental policy like "product
21responsibility from cradle to grave" involve the danger of encouraging trends
towards concentration and vertical integration.
As for the impacts negotiated agreements on the disposal of old cars have on the
structure ofthe disposal industry, it is the effects on the number of receiving points
and on the number of businesses doing the recycling that are decisive. In general,
trends towards concentration in the industry are expected on account of more
stringent disposal standards.
In principle all specialized businesses meeting the criteria for recogmtIOn or
certification enjoy unrestricted access to the system. However, there are dangers-
involved in the formulation of the criteria licensed businesses have to meet. Here
unnecessary barriers to access could be erected favouring financially-strong
companies, for example, because large investments prove necessary. The
Association of German Car Recycling Businesses (ada) is talking of an existential
threat to the small and mid-size structure ofits industry (AUTORECYCLING, issue
1/96). Besides, if vehicle manufacturers largely control the disposal industry, one
also has to fear that the option ofrecycling becomes less attractive to disposers, for
manufacturers will probably prefer to sell new parts.
Competition in the recycling industry is indeed in danger of being harmed to the
detriment ofsmall to medium-sized businesses owing to cooperation between large
manufacturers and suppliers. This can happen at the expense of the hitherto
dominating small to medium-sized businesses; a pattern already familiar from the
development ofthe Dual System Germany.
Irrespective of the question of licensing criteria for businesses, a network could,
once it has been set up, be subject to the abuse of power. In analogy to the
relationship between large motor vehicle manufacturers and suppliers, ominous
structures can develop between manufacturers and recyclers (BENZLERILOBBE
1995:157). The take-back network can also lead to a monopolization of the spare
parts market and of shredder activities. For example, the Association of the
Automotive Industry (VDA) had originally planned to couple the free take-back
with brand commitment concerning spare parts, but this point was dropped in the
course ofthe negotiations (HOMBURGER 1996).
7.2.5 Enhancingcleaner production: fair rules instead ofvoluntariness
It is obvious that end-of-pipe technologies will not automatically start to be
superseded by cleaner production (SRU 1994:Tz 262). According to the German
Council of Environmental Advisors, the prospects for clean technology greatly
depend on progress being made in environmental policy with respect to the
correction of the structure of relative prices, which still encourage an
overexploitation ofthe natural life-sustaining systems.
22On the other hand, voluntary agreements, by virtue of their approach, are not up to
the job ifinstead ofaccompanying a correction ofrelative prices, they are used as a
substitute thereof and made without giving due consideration to the market.
9 Even
if, for example, fuel consumption in motor vehicles is successfully cut, unless
additional price incentives are provided to use energy economically and to buy
these vehicles, these innovations will tum into part of the decoration at motor
shows, without large numbers ofthem being sold to the public.
As long as the wrong rules apply, it seems unlikely that a player is voluntarily going
to behave in the ecological manner desired. However, whenever a desired form of
behaviour fails to materialize voluntarily, government can respond in two ways.
Either it puts up with failures in environmental policy and thereby shows that it
leaves the design ofthe political framework to influential pressure groups, or sooner
or later it helps things along with coercive measures. In this way voluntary
measures, despite their own low intervention intensity, can in the long term entail a
spiral-ofintervention with unacceptably high intervention intensity.
7.2.6 Green dot: Market-oriented approach with some marketimperfections
As for cooperative solutions, it is in principle also possible to develop
environmental policy instruments that take free-market principles into account. Due
to the problems of charging social costs relating to the dumping of waste with the
help of dump charges, the ordinance governing packaging, for instance, and the
Dual System it spawned represent two variants ofinstruments of control that make
sense in economic terms and are in keeping with the market. Although juridically
speaking take-back duties are commands, these commands are less questionable
from an ordoliberal point of view, since they provide the standard addressee with
scope for individual adjustment (SPIES 1994:309).
In the field of packaging, too, reservations from the point of view of competition
policy have to be expressed. German disposal markets are highly cartelized and
oligopolized. The Dual System is a demand cartel legitimated by the ordinance on
9 Economically speaking, for companies the application ofclean technology is in the short term
linked with increasing costs and financial risks. Disadvantages of integrated technologies from
the point of view of an entrepreneurs' investment calculations, are higher access and
information costs, adjustment and changeover costs, funding bottlenecks, long decision-making
horizons and greater economic risk. Here negotiated agreements may be able to provide an
additional impetus for adjustment and changeover, but an adjustment to ecological requirements
in a way that minimises the costs for the overall economy is not to be expected with voluntary
agreements in view of the restriction to certain technologies and the expected free rider-
behaviour on the part ofthe companies.
23packaging. There is always just one disposer per territorial division who is given the
tasks ofcollecting and sorting. 10
However, the Dual System also shows that non-uniform action in different countries
can lead to distorted competition in foreign trade. Negative impacts of the Dual
System on the European disposal industry become apparent in the case of waste
paper, for example. German recyclers get their waste paper free of charge, whereas
other European recyclers have to bear the collecting and sorting costs themselves.
This cost advantage not only de facto represents an import impediment, but also
leads to increasing German exports ofwaste paper. For example, in France this has
the ecologically-ridiculous consequence that growing amounts of waste paper have
to be incinerated or put on dumps for lack ofdemand (WUPPERMAN 1993:453).
7.3 Economic efficiency
7.3.1 COragreement is not cost-efficient
Solutions to the problem of reducing emissions are economically cost-effective if
each emitter fixes his contribution to the reduction in such a manner that the overall
economic avoidance costs are minimised. Individual emitters neither know the
avoidance costs nor are they interested in including them in their decision-making,
hence, these signals have to be sent through environmental policy. Levies and
permits in particular are classic textbook instruments meeting the economic
efficiency criteria, because they send out these signals in the form ofa correction of
relative prices. On the other hand, a reduction in emissions with minimal costs for
the overall economy is unlikely to be achieved via a voluntary agreement on carbon
dioxide or eco-efficient cars, for instance, due to the restriction to certain sectors
and the free-rider behaviour to be expected on the part of the members of the
associations.
Moreover, voluntary agreements are not convincing when it comes to their dynamic
efficiency, i.e. their effect on technological progress. Here it is possible to compare
voluntary agreements to regulations. Once the goal has been achieved, there are no
further incentives to reduce emissions. Compared with regulations, there does not
even inevitably have to be an incentive to maintain the standard once it has been
attained (KREUZBERG 1993:309).
10 The Federal Ministry for the Environment justifies the formation of cartels saying that new
environmental technologies will be developed. In a diametrically opposed view the Federal
Cartel Authority in Berlin regards functioning competition as the essential driving force for the
development ofnew environmental technologies (WELT of 15 April 1996). The amendment of
the ordinance on packaging, which is to take effect soon, is to promote competition by
stipulating that disposal activities (collecting, sorting, recycling) linked to dual systems have to
be put out to tender (UMWELT, 4/1996).
247.3.2 Cost-efficient CFC phase-out
When assessing the economic efficiency ofGerman agreements on reducing ozone-
damaging substances, consideration has to be given to three unusual features in
particular that accelerated the substitution on managerial grounds alone:
• the ban on CFCs as propellants for most aerosol products in the US as early as
1978,
• the declining demand for products containing CFCs (e.g. aerosols) and
• the availability oflow-cost substitutes.
The economic cost efficiency ofnegotiated agreements on CFCs has to be regarded
as positive. Each agreement covered the main polluters, which were enabled to
imple~ent the reduction at the lowest possible cost.
Concerning dynamic efficiency, here, too, one has to repeat: Once the goal has been
achieved, there are no further incentives for progress in terms of environmental
technology. However, with respect to the development of environmentally-friendly
CFC substitutes, the bottom line is that owing to the aforementioned unusual
features there had already been sufficient incentives for technological progress.
II
7.3.3 Fundamentaldistortions ofwaste markets
Although the distribution of scarce environmental resources takes place in an
allocation-efficient fashion via a change in relative prices, waste disposal in
Germany is confronted with fundamental market distortions. The capacity problem
regarding dumps would theoretically best be solved by charging dump users in line
with the polluter pays principle all internal and social costs that arise, that is to say
by increasing dump charges. Among the costs not included fully today, the costs
relating to dump-scarcity, dump operation and dump emissions feature prominently.
So far costs relating to the environment have been externalized as much as possible.
However, on account ofan inflexible scale ofcharges, dump operators are not able
to charge users all their operational costs (BRENCK et al. 1996:1). Inefficient forms
II What has turned out to be a particularly efficient instrument in the US to protect the ozone layer
is the simultaneous application of permits and a tax for the protection of the ozone layer. The
American environmental agency EPA estimates that the administrative costs amounted to only
10 per cent of the administrative work a regulation would have entailed. Furthermore, it was
possible to quickly adjust the licenses issued to the modifications of the Montreal Protocol.
Whereas in 1988 the cost of halving CFC consumption was put at $ 3.50 per kilograrnm, only
two years later it was possible to lower these estimates to $ 2.20 per kilograrnm (COOK
1996:4f.).
25of organisation in tum lead to price increases; on the whole serious distortions in
the cost structures ensue.
12
In view of the increase pledged in recycling quotas, the establishment of the
disposal system for old cars involves considerable costs. As the establishment and
maintenance of the disposal system represent sunk costs, there is a growing
incentive for businesses to partially recycle the old cars that were taken back, or to
recycle the raw materials they contain. Yet, it still depends on the relative price for
newly purchased raw materials or for newly produced car parts whether there will in
fact be a drop in the volume ofwaste to be dumped or in net resource input.
The fact that cars are taken back free of charge does justice to the polluter pays
principle, since the producer bearing product responsibility is charged the disposal
costs. Thus, the solution is dynamically efficient, for the producer is provided with
incentives to look for technological innovations in competition with other producers
(SACKSOFSKY 1996:103). However, the question arises whether the disposal
costs are high enough in relation to other production costs to initiate recycling-
oriented research and development.
7.3.4 GreenDoteconomically efficient
In the packaging sector, founded on the ordinance on packaging, an economically-
efficient system was created on a voluntary basis by introducing the Green Dot
system. A graduated system of royalties paid by packing material producers and
distributors to the Dual System Germany Ltd. shows a tendency ofcharging costs in
accordance with the polluter pays principle and thus results in the marginal
avoidance costs being compensated for.
However, reservations result from the changed conditions in the disposal and
recycling of packaging following the establishment of the Dual System. Strong
concentration effects in the disposal and recycling markets make monopoly and
oligopoly profits possible, and sometimes transaction costs have risen considerably
compared with the status quo ante. The financial crisis experienced by the DSD in
1993 halfway through the year illustrates the level of transaction costs associated
with this system. On the expenditure side, collecting and sorting costs had soared on
account of higher-than-expected volumes. As for the disposal of the remnants, the
problem that emerged was that disposal businesses owned by private persons or
12 When shredder residues were classified as hazardous waste in 1990, this was a measure that
aimed at containing shredder residues from the disposal ofold cars and that had a great impact
on prices. Dumping costs rose from around DM 70 per ton to between DM 500 and DM 1,000
per ton (1992) (WEILAND 1995:58). However, it is still too early to comment on the measure's
directive effect. According to theAssociation of German Car Recycling Business (ada) the the
share ofwaste from the disposal ofold cars - in particular plastics - is still increasing.
26local authorities are able to charge monopoly prices. With respect to the revenue
side, the Green Dot was frequently used without making the corresponding royalty
payments to the DSD. By September 1993 a deficit amounting to DM 710 million
had accumulated (WUPPERMAN 1993:450). '
7.4 Institutional controllability
7.4.1 Enforceability depends on induced costs and external pressure
In principle the enforceability of voluntary agreements in associations depends on
three factors:
• the costs ofthe agreement made,
• the costs ofthe government ordinance looming in the case ofnon-performance of
the agreement and
• the effectiveness of possible punishment meted out by the associations
themselves (e.g. expulsion from the association).
Whereas "no regrets" measures are unlikely to meet with much opposition in an
association, pledges going beyond them involve the danger ofan internal allocation
struggle, which can let a withdrawal from the commitment seem worthwhile. In
such cases certain passages in the declaration providing scope for interpretation, or
preconditions for the agreement that were never met can provide a welcome
opportunity to terminate cooperation.
Problems regarding enforceability are not expected to emerge in the case of the
automotive industry's fairly undemanding voluntary agreement on reducing fuel
consumption. According to the German Council of Environmental Advisers latest
annual report (1996:Tz. 166, translated by the authors) "it is widely believed that
the goal of cutting fuel consumption by 25 per cent over 15 years, based on a
relatively high average consumption, is in line with the expected technological
development already. The pledge to launch car models by the year 2000 with diesel
engines consuming three to four litres per 100 Ian cannot claim to be a special feat
ofengineering, either"."
On the other hand, problems relating to the enforcement ofvoluntary agreements on
carbon dioxide reduction in associations have been revealed, e.g. in talks conducted
by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (UBA) with representatives from
the associations in connection with the climate protection initiative launched by the
German business community. For example, UBA's annual report reads (1993:167,
translated by the authors): "The talks revealed fundamental difficulties whenever
negotiated agreements made by associations are to contain binding requirements
27that are usually laid down in a statutory basis. Many individual businesses refuse to
recognize deClarations ma<:ie by their associations as binding. It is virtually
impossible to impose sanctions following non-compliance of the agreements".
Thus, the instrument of negotiated agreements reaches limits which result from its
voluntary nah.ir~.
7.4.2 Redistribution at the expense ofthird parties
Since the instrument of voluntary agreements per se does not send out any price
signals that lead to automatic ~djusiinerits on the part of the players, decisions have
to be made'on a case-by-case basis on \low the overall reduction targeted is to be
divided up between individual groups. This, some peopie say, involves the danger
that groups that are inferior i.n terms ofthe way they are organized, like households,
ultimately have to bear the largest adjustment burden. This has to be qualified by
saying that this argument can also be used against economic instruments. In real life
the political t~presentatibil of interests also plays an important part with economic
instruments, for instance when exceptional areas are stipulated that will be
exempted from energy taXes. Even Denmark, a country usually regarded as
exemplary ~hen it conies to introduCing ecologibil taxes; has speciai arhirlgemehts
fot particularly energy-intensive businesses, and the burden of levies is mainly
borne by ptjvate households (MEZ 1995:109 and 126). As the example shows, the
uriiforni price signals econorriic instruments want to bring about are frequently
watered down in the political process.
7.4.3 Relinquishment ofpolitical scope
The updated declaration presented by the German business comrilUoity on the
prevention of damage to the climate once again clearly indicates the iilnits of
voluntary agreements. If the environmental goal obviously runs counter to the
individual economic interests ofthe associations, people - like some representatives
ofthe VDEW recently - suddenly talk ofthe ,,fetish year 2005" in connection with
the Federal Governmerit's timetable. Although, for example, the VDEW's
agreement already is a scaled-down version (providing for a reduction of merely 8
to 10 per cent by the year 2005); undesired political measures (e.g. in nuclear
energy policy) may prompt termination ofthe agreement. In any case, a government
has to expect being asked whether it is p~ssible for a pledge with little substance to
be worth so much that the government in return, for decades to come, puts up with
being deprived ofagreat number of potential courses of action relating to climate
and energy policies.
288 General conclusions and future perspectives
8.1 General Conlusions
The examples analyzed here have offered weaknesses ofvoluntary agreements with
regard to goal-conformity, system-conformity, cost-efficciency and institutional
controllability. However, it can be argued that hardly any instrument will meet all
these criteria. If it does theoretically, it may be watered down in the political
process (or perhaps will not be implemented at all). Thus, it should be mentioned
that there may be reasonable applications for voluntary agreements, but the
instrument should be used very carefully. Against this background, we want to draw
some general lessons from the German experience and give some recommendations
for the international discussion of using voluntary agreements within the European
Union.
Opportunities for the application ofvoluntary agreements that are welcome from an
ordoliberal point of view especially exist if they are used within a mix of policy-
instruments. If economic incentives are introduced on a voluntary basis (example:
Green Dot) or if agreements are used to accompany economic instruments
(example: combination of carbon taxes and voluntary agreements), agreements
would really deserve the attribute of being market-based. Ifeconomic instruments
cannot be employed, for instance when substances have been completely banned,
negotiated agreements as "soft" instruments of environmental policy can certainly
serve to accompany "tough" regulatory measures or - provided it is not a matter of
warding off acute dangers - to replace them (example: CFC-phase out). Except for
these areas, however, from an ordoliberal point other instruments are preferable.
By combining negotiated agreements and economic instruments, it is possible to
avoid a lack of incentives, which is one of the worst flaws of most voluntary
agreements in terms of design. To date a lack of incentives has led to voluntary
agreements either being undemanding with regard to the contents and being phrased
accordingly, or, in the case of more ambitious pledges, to them being associated
with a great amount oftime and effort needed for enforcement and monitoring. It is
also due to a lack of incentives that as a rule, only specific and no absolute
reductions are achieved. Without any signals in favour of a way of using
environmental resources' that is generally less harmful, even with demanding
specific reduction goals there is the risk that an overall increasing consumption of
environmental resources will overcompensate for these goals.
The increasing significance of voluntary agreements in current environmental
policies may have to do with them being labelled "market based instruments" and
the fact that their increased use is associated with hopes of thus strengthening the
market system. However, a more in-depth analysis reveals that although in principle
it is possible to design voluntary agreements in a manner that is in keeping with a
market economy, in most cases people avoid doing it. As the examples that were
29studied showed, such a free market-oriented design does not come about voluntarily
and spontaneously, rather it requires standards and a framework set by government.
However, once such a framework is set, agreements may be used as a tool for
implementation within an environmental policy-mix.
For this reason one has to strongly advise the government against making a
commitment to the effect that in return for voluntary declarations on environmental
protection, the government will not make use of any other instru~ents. This
imposes disproportionately severe restrictions on the politicians' latitude in how
they act in the future and thus on their capacity for problem-solving. Such a policy
tends to neglect other solutions that may be more appropriate to the problem, such
as the application ofa mixture ofenvironmental policy instruments.
If a decision to give preference to voluntary solutions in general is made or if a
decision in favour of such solutions is taken at an early stage, this too is
counterproductive;because the substance ofnegotiated solutions - the governmental
"potential for threats" - is weakened and delays in the form ofa stamina contest are
provoked. The examples that were examined confirmed that without considerable
governmental pressure, voluntary agreements do not yield any pledges that go
beyond "business as usual" or ,,no regrets" measures. In order to make it'absolutely
clear that the government really ,,is in control", the scope for design in
environmental policy has to be kept unrestricted and flexible. On the other hand,
giving priority to voluntary solutions on principle imposes disproportionately
severe restrictions on government when it comes to quickly reverting to "tough"
environmental policy instruments following unsatisfactory negotiation results or
delayed implementation.
8.2 European Perspectives
Although our case studies represent only German experiences, some lessons can be
drawn for the use of voluntary agreements on a European level. As it seems, the
European Commission is aware of several potential shortcomings of agreeements
being stated here.
In November 1996 the European Co.mmission issued a communication examining
the use of environmental agreements as an instrument of ED environment policy
(Com (96) 561). The (non-binding) paper deals with the instrument in general,
presents guidelines on "environmental agreements" and provides a survey over the
use ofvoluntary (environmental) agreements in the Member States.
The guidelines given by the Commission point out seven topics that should be taken






• public information and transparency,
• independent verification ofresults and
• additional guaranteees.
Before an environmental agreement is concluded, the paper says, all interested
parties (companies, business associations, environment groups and public
authorities) should have the opportunity to comment on the draft. Their opions
should be taken into account.
The legal status of an agreement plays an important role for the sucess of an
agreement. According to the Commission, binding agreements provide in general
better safeguards in terms of achieving environmental objectives. Contracts
(binding on both parties) offer a well-defined framework that may include sanctions
for noncompliance and is enforcable through the courts.
The weakness and bad reputation ofcertain past agreements partly derive from the
lack ofquantified objectives, leaving room for the perception that agreements were
usedto avoid or delay effectice action, the Commisssion states. Objectives have to
be quantified in figures as opposed to "best efforts" clauses.Also intermediate
objectives should be set to show the effectiveness ofan agreement.
According to the Commission's findings, results of agreements have to be
monitored, the agreement itselfshould define "how".
The failure of agreements, the paper goes on, is often connected with a lack of
public information and transparency. Transparency is crucial to assure third parties
that non-regulatory obligations are kept. Agreements should be published in the
national Official Journal or an equallly public document. Even a public register of
agreements should be considered.
In some cases it may be appropriate to set up a committee or independent body to
collect, evaluate, or verify results, This is particularly important in cases where the
measuring methods differ or where the disclosure of business secrets has to be
avoided.
31As an additional guarantee that the agreement will be fulfilled, dissuasive sanctions
such as fines and penalties could be foreseen for case of noncompliance, the
Commission concludes.
Measuring the German way of using environmental agreements at the standard set
by the Commission's guidelines, one will find that the national agreements fall
behind in nearly every respect. Apart from the fact, that all the German agreements
are non-binding, the procedure while negotiating an agreement and the structure of
the final commitment show a whole lot ofdeficiencies.
Thus, fundamental flaws of the negotiations may be overcome when the guideline
will be followed. From our point of view it is important to mention that, according
to the communication ofthe Commission:
1. A cost-effective use of agreements will be made as a part ofpolicy mix together
with, for-example, regulatory oreconomic instruments and
2. agreements may be under certain circumstances an efficient tool for
implementing of environmental policy, but they are not appropriate for
environmental target setting. General targets should be set through legislation.
These basic conclusions go along with the findings of our study. The politician's
"art of the possible" may now be to look carefully for reasonable applications of
agreements without falling back to traditional command-and-control measures. As
experiences in Belgium (Seyad et al.:1996) and the United Kingdom (Eden:1996)
show, neither a strategy ofstrong regulation ofvoluntary agreements (which makes
the agreements obsolete) nor a strategy of far-reaching deregulation (or self-
regulation) of environmental target-setting seems to be promising. If not driven to
one of these extremes, there may be several applications for more flexible ways of
environmental policy.
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